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A SEA CHANGE IN CREDITOR PRIORITIES
Kristen van de Biezenbos*
This Article argues that the operation of maritime law undermines a primary justi-
fication for creditor priorities under U.S. law. Under current law, when a debtor
becomes insolvent, its secured creditors will be paid the full amount of their debt to
the extent of their security interest, even if that leaves nothing to pay unsecured
creditors. This is controversial with respect to involuntary unsecured creditors, par-
ticularly those with tort claims against the debtor. Defenders of this scheme of
priorities have argued that allowing greater priority to involuntary creditors would
hinder the availability or increase the cost of credit. However, involuntary creditors
have long enjoyed priority over secured creditors under maritime law, and it does
not appear that firms subject to maritime law have experienced these effects. Experi-
ence with this priority scheme under maritime law may provide support for efforts to
reform current U.S. law to give greater priority to involuntary creditors more
generally.
INTRODUCTION
Secured credit is widely viewed as an essential part of commercial
finance, yet it is also a source of controversy among scholars. The
issue is so polarizing that, while some have referred to secured
credit as a “blazing success,” others describe it as “evil, irrational[,
and] . . . mysterious,” as well as a form of theft.1 The core of the
debate involves Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which provides that, in most circumstances, secured creditors have
absolute priority over all other creditors; this means that they have
first claim on a debtor’s assets serving as collateral up to the
amount of their debt in the case of foreclosure and, generally, in
bankruptcy as well.2 As a result, secured creditors are paid first and
* Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. My thanks to
Loyola for research grant support and to the members of the Tulane University Law School
Junior Faculty Brownbag and Intellectual Life Workshops for their insights. Special thanks to
Lynn LoPucki, Martin Davies, Adam Feibelman, Saru Matambanadzo, Shu-Yi Oei, Kara
Bruce, Sally Richardson, Amy Stein, Agnieszka McPeak, Catherine Hardee, and Anna
VanCleave for their invaluable comments on this paper and to Annelise Riles for her
willingness to comment on future drafts.
1. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1785 (1994); David Gray
Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2179 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L. J. 1143 (1979); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Infor-
mation: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997); Douglas G. Baird,
The Importance of Priority, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (1997); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency
Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
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completely if a debtor becomes insolvent, while unsecured credi-
tors must share whatever remains of the debtor’s assets, subject to a
security interest upon foreclosure. Many unsecured lenders, such as
commercial banks, understand this ex ante when they lend to a
debtor, but others do not. In particular, some unsecured creditors,
such as tort victims, are involuntarily subjected to this priority
scheme even though they never intended for the debtor to owe
them in the first place.3 Since the late 1970s, scholars have grappled
with the distribution scheme of Article 9 and its apparent prefer-
ence for sophisticated lenders over unwitting third parties.4 When
the dust settled in the late 1990s, the debate over secured credit
seemed at an impasse. Meanwhile, priority treatment of secured
creditors under Article 9 continues.
Initially, the debate over secured credit focused on economic ar-
guments that sought to understand—and justify—this priority
system based on the effects on the availability and costs of credit.5
According to some scholars, secured credit is efficient because it
shifts monitoring costs away from secured creditors, who take secur-
ity instead of incurring the cost of monitoring the debtor’s financial
health, and, in return, charge the debtor a lower interest rate.6 By
contrast, voluntary unsecured creditors do not have security and so
must monitor the debtor for any changes in capital structure that
might impair the debtor’s ability to repay, but they can charge
higher interest rates to compensate for those monitoring costs.7
Other scholars have criticized this view, pointing out that fre-
quently secured creditors are better able to monitor the debtor
than unsecured creditors.8 Further, the priority treatment of se-
cured claims means that involuntary unsecured creditors such as
tort victims bear the risk of loss when the debtor does not have
sufficient assets to pay the secured creditors or only has enough
assets to cover the secured claims.9 These tort claimants include,
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857
(1996) [hereinafter Uneasy Case 1].
3. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2; Warren, supra note 2; Baird, supra
note 2; Adler, supra note 2; Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply
to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997) [hereinafter Uneasy Case 2].
4. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2; Warren, supra note 2; Baird, supra note 2;
Adler, supra note 2; Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2.
5. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4.
6. Id. at 1149–58.
7. Id.
8. See Part I, infra.
9. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV., 1887, 1893 (1994).
As LoPucki puts it, “Law and Economics relies heavily on consent to prove the inherent
justice of the way things are. When the analysis requires the consent of a party to some aspect
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but are not limited to, victims of negligence, toxic torts, and busi-
ness torts.10 Some argue that from a welfare economics perspective,
secured credit may actually be inefficient because it allows a com-
pany to externalize its tort liability, which may distort the true cost
of doing business.11
In response to the fact that the Article 9 priority system can
sometimes leave tort victims uncompensated and allow debtors to
externalize their tort liability, some scholars have called for revising
Article 9 to give “super-priority” to tort victims over secured credi-
tors.12 Supporters of secured credit have attacked these proposals as
undermining Article 9 and potentially having an adverse effect on
commercial lending.13 Because relatively little empirical evidence
shows either that the Article 9 priority system is efficient or ineffi-
cient, or that its positive effect on lending outweighs its negative
effects on tort victims, there has been no significant movement in
the debate.14
of social organization, but that party clearly did not give it, the standard economic move is to
argue that the party would have agreed to that aspect ex ante, by which they mean before the
party knew what role it would have in society.” Id. at 1899.
10. This category includes “(1) product liability claimants; (2) victims of business torts,
ranging from negligence to intentional interference with contractual relations; (3) victims of
antitrust violations, unfair competition, and patent, trademark and copyright infringement;
(4) environmental agencies that perform clean-ups; (5) taxing authorities; (6) creditors who
became such through the debtor’s fraud, including securities fraud; (7) government agen-
cies . . . and (8) utility companies.” Id. at 1896. Conceptually, the recommendations made in
this Article also apply to other involuntary creditors.
11. When a company’s assets are insufficient to cover all secured claims, or are just suffi-
cient enough to cover only those claims, tort claimants could potentially receive nothing,
meaning that the company has not internalized the costs of its wrongdoing but instead has
shifted those costs to the public. See, e.g., Christopher M.E. Painter, Tort Creditor Priority in the
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1058–61 (1984).
Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried argue that secured credit is actually inefficient and propose
that secured creditors be given partial, as opposed to absolute, priority. Uneasy Case 1, supra
note 2, at 867–72. One source of the inefficiencies, according to Bebchuck and Fried, is that
allowing secured creditors and debtors the ability to force third parties to assume the risk of
the debtor’s failure encourages those two parties to enter into this arrangement, even when it
is not efficient to do so. Id. at 870.
12. Warren, supra note 2; Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2; see also F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1411–12 (1986) (arguing that secured credit is efficient
but suggesting that involuntary creditors could be granted “superpriority rights . . . ranking
them ahead of consensual secured creditors”). See generally LoPucki, supra note 9.
13. See Warren, supra note 2, at 1385–86 (1997). LoPucki gives an overview of the strate-
gies that debtors might employ, wishing to make themselves “judgment proof,” which in turn
would give involuntary creditors no recovery because there would be no assets from which to
recover. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 62–64 (1996). Part III.C,
infra, addresses these concerns.
14. Some literature suggests that very large companies do not use secured credit often
so that the problem of tort victims’ subordination in priority under Article 9 is not severe. See,
e.g., Yair Listoken, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An
Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1044 (2008) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests
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This Article argues that the experience of private actors subject
to maritime law can shift the debate. Maritime law is the oldest
form of commercial law still in practice and reflects a long-standing
collaboration of financial institutions, commercial borrowers, and
individual actors in the shipping and maritime transportation in-
dustries.15 It gives super-priority to certain classes of involuntary
unsecured creditors, including tort victims, via an in rem action
against a vessel or vessels, but yields to the Article 9 priority system
in bankruptcy. Maritime law thus offers a concrete picture of how
to reform secured credit to protect tort victims without freezing the
availability of credit or unfairly punishing secured lenders.
Although some writers in the secured credit debate have noted
the priority scheme under maritime law, this Article is the first to
compare it systemically to Article 9 and to explore its potential im-
plications. This Article proposes that the experience of parties
subject to maritime law challenges the view that giving super-prior-
ity to tort claimants would impair the ability of debtors to obtain
financing. Although tort victims have long had priority over se-
cured creditors in maritime in rem actions, no evidence suggests
that this priority scheme has negatively impacted credit availability
or cost to maritime borrowers.16 Further, this Article proposes that
some additional assumptions and conclusions employed by both
sides of the debate may not be correct. In particular, this Article
challenges the presumptions that secured credit necessarily encour-
ages poor monitoring and the inefficient use of debt covenants,
and that tort victim super-priority would be inefficient because of
increased transaction costs. Using maritime law as a case study, this
Article illustrates how and why these assumptions may not be
correct.
Part I of this Article gives a brief overview of the debate over se-
cured credit. Part II gives an overview of the priority scheme of the
maritime in rem action, the justifications for that scheme, and the
that large, “high tort” debtors use secured credit less frequently than smaller companies).
While it is possibly true that large companies with sufficient asset pools will not use secured
credit because of the additional transaction costs, most small and mid-sized businesses do use
secured credit, and anyone who suffers based on such business’s tortious activity may be
subordinated under Article 9.
15. As more fully discussed in Part II.A, infra, customary admiralty law predates the writ-
ten record, with the Rhodian Sea Law (Nomos Rhodion Nautikos, dating in written form from
around 600–800 C.E.) standing as probably the earliest recorded example. See GEORGE
MOUSOURAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN LAW 404 (2003). Mar-
itime law scholars who have written on the history of present-day admiralty law trace the
origin of many current principles to the Rhodian Sea Law. See, e.g., PETER N. EHLERS, ELISA-
BETH MANN BORGESE, ET AL., EDS., MARINE ISSUES: FROM A SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 2–5 (2002).
16. See Part II, infra.
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response of secured lenders to being behind tort claimants in that
context. This includes a review of the mechanics of the in rem action
and the ranking of priorities according to last in time, first in right.
Part III examines whether the design of priorities under maritime
law calls into question some of the assumptions that reforms to the
Article 9 priority scheme cannot address the unfair prejudice that
prevents tort victims from obtaining compensation for their
injuries.
I. THE DEBATE OVER SECURED CREDIT
Although the principles of secured credit and secured creditor
priority are possibly “fundamental” commercial finance law, it is un-
clear whether those principles benefit anyone other than secured
creditors. Indeed, the debate over secured credit has been smolder-
ing “like a coal mine fire” for over three decades;17 partly because,
of all the provisions of the UCC, Article 9 and the resulting secured
credit system have the most direct impact on commercial transac-
tions, even though the effects are not fully felt until the debtor is in
financial distress.18 Under the current regime, secured creditors are
entitled to the highest priority in bankruptcy proceedings, which
means that the entire amount of the creditor’s debt up to the value
of its collateral will be satisfied before making any payment to any
unsecured creditors.19 Secured claims are prioritized on a first in
time, first in right basis, so the first claims filed in accordance with
Article 9 will take precedence.20
Article 9 is not only a relatively recent development, but it is also
a departure from the state of the law prior to when it was drafted.21
Under the traditional common law, one individual could only ob-
tain a security interest in personal property by taking actual
possession of the property.22 Grant Gilmore, who was instrumental
in drafting the first iteration of Article 9, characterizes the time
before its promulgation as “a period of disintegration.”23 During
that time, expanding exceptions that varied from state to state be-
gan to “whittle[ ] away” the long-standing principle that non-
possessory interests in personal property were permissible only in
17. LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1890.
18. See Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477, 480 (1973).
19. Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 867.
20. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1795–96 (1994).
21. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 288 (1965).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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connections with certain types of negotiable interests.24 Article 9
represented an attempt to harmonize this inconsistent system,
which arose as a patchwork of state laws as lawmakers responded to
the increasing demands of lenders to receive non-possessory secur-
ity interests in all types of personal property.25 Even during the
drafting stage, tension existed over whether Article 9 unfairly fa-
vored institutional lenders. Concerns arose that harmonization
might favor lenders too much at the expense of third parties. The
counter-arguments contended that attempts to protect third parties
were inappropriate “social legislation” that unfairly discriminated
against banks and consumer lending institutions.26 In Gilmore’s
view, Article 9’s focus on lenders was all for the best due to the
“impossibility of arriving at a satisfactory solution.”27
A. The Justifications for Secured Credit
The traditional justification for secured credit is that it increases
the amount of credit available to borrowers by incentivizing lend-
ers, whom the risk of default might otherwise have deterred.28 The
entrance of Law and Economics scholars into the conversation par-
ticularly jump-started scholarly interest in secured credit and the
absolute priority rule.29 In particular, Thomas H. Jackson, Anthony
T. Kronman, and Douglas G. Baird were early proponents of the
idea that an efficiency analysis can explain (and justify) secured
credit.30 They advanced the “creditor’s bargain” model, which pos-
tulates that secured credit is efficient because the secured creditor
24. See id.
25. Id. (describing the drafting of Article 9 as an attempt at synthesizing state laws of
security, which Gilmore described as laws “of extraordinary complexity in which a transaction
relatively simple in itself had become fragmented into bits and pieces.”).
26. Id. at 293.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 536 (3rd ed. 1974)
(Firms that pose a significant risk of default often “cannot obtain credit on an unsecured
basis. . . In order to make a loan, lenders require security so as to reduce their risk of loss.”).
29. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2.
30. See id.; Thomas H. Jackson & Douglas G. Baird, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treat-
ment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984). In the latter article, Jackson and Baird point out
that many non-Law and Economics scholars who object to absolute priority often focus only
on bankruptcy proceedings. Jackson & Baird, supra, at 101–02. According to Jackson and
Baird, even if an argument can be made that absolute priority should not be the rule in non-
bankruptcy debt collection, the rule should be preserved in bankruptcy. Id. at 101. This ex-
ception for bankruptcy results from trying to address all of the myriad harms that a corporate
failure might cause beyond the scope of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 102–03. This Article
addresses this argument in Part II, infra.
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is willing to offer credit at lower rates to debtors with liquidity
problems in return for security.31 Access to credit would increase
efficiency by encouraging parties to lend because they can protect
their investment via security in lieu of monitoring the creditor’s en-
tire business.32 Conversely, the voluntary unsecured creditor does
not have any guarantee that it will receive payment in full in the
event of the debtor’s insolvency, but it can charge higher interest
rates in compensation for its monitoring burden and the higher
risk of non-payment.33
This explanation initially held great appeal, as it explained why
secured credit was popular with lenders despite higher transactions
costs. However, the creditor’s bargain model swiftly came under fire
because it did not comport with commercial realities. Alan Schwartz
and Saul Levmore argued that Jackson and Kronman’s hypothesis
leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that those creditors who
are typically unsecured, such as trade creditors and employees, are
better at monitoring against debtor misbehavior than those typical
secured parties, such as banks and financial institutions.34 Instead,
Schwartz asserted that there was no real supportable argument in
favor of secured credit.35 However, he also believed that no reform
of Article 9 should occur until either research had revealed
whether a more plausible justification for the current system exists
or, conversely, what effects any proposed changes would have on
the availability of credit.36
31. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor’s Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L. J. 857, 869 (1982); Buckley, supra note 12, at 1393; see also Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 2, at 1147–61 (defense based on monitoring considerations). The start-
ing point for the efficiency analysis of secured credit is the Modigliani-Miller theorem of
corporate capital structure, which states that, in a perfect market, that how that firm is fi-
nanced does not affect the value of a firm. See Baird, supra note 2, at 1422.
32. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1147–61.
33. Id. Jackson and Baird subsequently elaborated on the Jackson and Kronman argu-
ment; they posited that there are two categories of monitors: specialized monitors, who take
security interests in assets that they are particular suited to monitor, and general monitors,
who may remain unsecured in order to exploit their comparative monitoring advantage or
take security in specific assets in order to reduce their higher monitoring costs. DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, THOMAS H. JACKSON, & RANDAL C. PICKER, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECUR-
ITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 361–67 (1984).
34. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theo-
ries, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8–9 (1981); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 69 (1982); Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Fi-
nancing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 909–10 (1986).
35. Id.
36. Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(1984) (“My article did not advocate repealing the privileges attached to secured debt, how-
ever, because then-current knowledge also did not permit very precise predictions about
repeal’s effects.”).
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A rush of scholarship responded to this criticism by proposing
different rationales for Article 9, most of which were variations on
the theme of monitoring costs.37 Like Schwartz, Saul Levmore rec-
ognized that secured debtors are typically most able to monitor
debtors.38 In Levmore’s view, secured debtors could use their moni-
toring abilities to help shareholders of debtor companies keep
abreast of the debtor’s financial health and possible misbehavior by
the debtor’s managers.39 Expounding on this view, Robert Scott
suggested that the relationship between debtors and secured credi-
tors actually encourages business development.40 Because Article 9
gives secured creditors a “floating lien” on a debtor’s present and
future assets, it provides the creditor with the power to “turn off the
spigot” of financing if the debtor fails act in the business’ best inter-
ests.41 Thus, secured creditors can take an active role in ensuring
that debtors behave in a financially responsible way, and secured
creditors perform functions they would otherwise not undertake
without security, which allows them to share in the debtor’s
returns.42
Others defended secured credit on property law principles.
Steven Harris and Charles Mooney, for example, suggested that the
fact that secured lending might work against the interests of third
parties does not necessitate a change.43 “[T]he assumption that the
creation of security interests—or any other voluntary activity, for
that matter—imposes costs on third parties, produces inefficient re-
sults, or otherwise is not socially optimal (or even useful) does not
compel the conclusion that the law should prohibit that activity.”44
Harris and Mooney also suggested that the real choice most com-
mercial debtors face is not whether to finance their venture with
37. See Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 933–55 (1985) (defense “based on realistic
observation of the commercial world”); Levmore, supra note 34, at 51 (noting how secured
lending can promote monitoring while minimizing free-rider problems); Scott, supra note
34, at 916–33 (arguing that secured lending as a relational contract serves monitoring goals);
James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473,
491–502 (1984) (maintaining that a firm can lower its cost of credit by granting security to
the most risk-averse creditors).
38. Levmore, supra note 34, at 69.
39. See id.
40. See Scott, supra note 34, at 948.
41. Id. at 913.
42. Id.
43. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2037 (1994).
44. Id. at 2026–27.
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secured or unsecured debt but rather whether to finance with se-
cured debt or not be able to obtain funding at all.45
However, others criticized Article 9 directly. In addition to the
problem of potential unfairness to unsecured third parties, as dis-
cussed below, they claimed that secured debt causes inefficient
bargaining between secured creditors and debtors.46 Whenever two
parties are able to shift the risk of loss from one another to a third
party, the parties are incentivized to do so, even when the relation-
ship—in this case, one of secured creditor and debtor—results in a
loss.47 This arrangement is also arguably at cross-purposes with the
goals of bankruptcy, which do not allow a debtor to increase the
pool of assets available to one creditor at the expense of another.48
Further, debtors could theoretically use secured debt to externalize
the costs of a debtor’s wrongdoing, since fully encumbering assets
with secured debt might make it nearly impossible for tort victims
and other involuntary creditors to recover.49 This cost externaliza-
tion would conceal the true cost of doing business from consumers,
as the debtor is not forced to raise prices to account for internal-
ized tort costs. In addition, as Warren has pointed out, proof does
not exist that the current system is actually efficient.50
45. See id. at 2030.
46. See Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 867–71.
47. Id. at 867.
48. Id. at 870–71.
49. See LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1897–99; see also David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1646–49 (1991). As LoPucki explains,
[t]o take the simplest example, assume that Debtor has assets of $100 and debt of
$100 owed to a creditor (“C”). Debtor then inflicts a tortious injury of $100 on a victim
(“T”). Debtor becomes liable for the tort, but does not gain from it, so that Debtor has
assets of $100 and debt of $200. Debtor is then liquidated. If the debt to C is un-
secured, C and T each receive distributions of $50. If the debt to C is secured, C
receives $100, and T receives nothing. Because C collects $100 with security and only
$50 without it, Debtor’s cost of borrowing from C likely will be lower if the loan is
secured. The cost saving thus achieved is not offset by higher costs of borrowing from
T, because T had no opportunity to bargain.
LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1898.
50. As Elizabeth Warren has stated,
without empirical evidence, it is hard to estimate the actual effects of a full priority
system show who benefits and who loses. No studies show the consequences of highly
leveraging businesses. No studies show larger economic effects of Article 9. Although a
number of Article 9 missionaries carry the message of Article 9 to foreign countries, as
Americans have actively pushed the adoption of a UCC-style full priority system
throughout Europe, Asia, and South America, the benefits of the system are asserted
rather than proved.
Warren, supra note 2, at 1379.
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Additionally, Article 9 is one of many corporate laws companies
can use to shield themselves from the consequences of tort liabil-
ity.51 These devices become particularly striking when companies
with low liquidity that engage in risky enterprises, and these are
precisely the kinds of entities that can only receive credit on a se-
cured basis. Take, for example, the New York City cab industry. In
the 1990s, the number of accidents involving New York taxis rose
dramatically.52 Many victims of accidents involving the cabs, includ-
ing injuries to bystanders, found themselves unable to collect their
tort awards because secured debt fully encumbered the taxi medal-
lions, even though they were worth approximately $275,000.53 In
some cases, the debt pre-dated the tort award, but in other cases,
the medallion owners procured additional secured debt after the
finding of liability in order to make the medallions judgment
proof.54
Typically, these types of enterprises or individuals, such as medi-
cal professionals, would remain answerable to tort victims through
general liability or malpractice insurance.55 Nevertheless, often
these debtors are often under-insured, which causes a substantial
level of exposure for the debtor itself.56 A debtor could theoretically
work around this exposure by fully encumbering its assets with se-
cured debt, with the intention that, between the inadequate
insurance and secured debt, the debtor would never pay the full
amount of tort damages for which it is responsible.57
51. See generally LoPucki, supra note 13.
52. Yeon-Koo Chee & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing, 39 RAND J. ECON.
926, 926–27 (2008). Although Chee and Spier provide an excellent economic analysis of
some strategies used to defeat judgment proofing, they have a more optimistic view of se-
cured debt as an incentive to prevent torts by the debtor. “The secured senior debtholders
face a lower risk of nonrepayment than the holders of junior claims and, as a consequence,
require a lower interest rate. This lower interest rate makes bankruptcy less likely, leading the
entrepreneur to better internalize the social harm from the risky activity.” Id. at 927. This
assertion does not fully make sense, as judgment proofing requires that the debtor never pays
its tort liabilities and instead externalizes the cost of its wrongdoing by making tort victims
bear the burden of their injuries.
53. Id. at 926.
54. Id. at 926 n.1.
55. See id. at 927.
56. Id. (describing various judgment-proofing techniques that physicians and other cor-
porate actors used).
57. In theory, a debtor who deliberately encumbers assets with secured debt for the
specific purpose of avoiding tort liability could be subject to corporate veil piercing and lia-
bility for fraudulent transfer.
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B. The Problem of Tort Victims
Many have strongly criticized the justifications for secured credit
because of its failure to account for the problem of tort victims, who
are in the position of creditors because of the debtor’s wrongdoing.
The traditional economic justification for tort liability is that it pro-
motes the efficient allocation of the resources: the internalization
of the costs of wrongdoing incentivizes the companies to find ways
to avoid causing harm.58 However, the Article 9 priority system is at
odds with this aim. As Baird stated,
[a] firm is more likely to engage in hazardous activity if any of
its investors, including secured creditors, can prime tort vic-
tims. As long as investors can enjoy the benefits when a firm
engages in a hazardous activity, but avoid some of the costs, a
firm will not fully account for the harm it causes to others.59
Not only is the priority scheme Article 9 established in apparent
opposition to the aim of tort liability, it is difficult to extend effi-
ciency rationales for Article 9 to account for tort victims because
these parties never intended to enter into a creditor-debtor rela-
tionship in the first place.60 The creditor’s bargain model, for
example, assumes that secured credit reflects the relationship that
creditors would choose if they could have bargained for their posi-
tions in rem.61 The model assumes that creditors consent to their
respective positions in relation to the debtor and that secured cred-
itors agree to charge lower interest rates in return for unsecured
creditors assuming the monitoring costs.62 However, this assump-
tion does not account for the fact that tort victims do not have the
option of charging a premium in return for subordinate status to
secured creditors, as they never anticipated becoming creditors in
the first place.63
Ordinarily, the law looks askance when two parties enter a con-
tract and agree that third parties will bear the risk of loss if one of
the parties is unable to honor its obligations.64 Yet, according to
58. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 1 (1987); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) (“I take it as
axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”).
59. Baird, supra note 2, at 1429.
60. See LoPucki, supra note 9 at 1901–02.
61. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1164.
62. See id. at 1147–61.
63. See LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1893.
64. See Warren, supra note 2, at 1375.
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critics of Article 9, secured credit allows just such an arrangement
to take place.65 Article 9’s treatment of involuntary creditors is one
of a number of devices in U.S. corporate law, such as the rise of the
limited liability company, that shield corporate entities from tort
liability.66 Criticism of secured credit’s role in this arrangement be-
gan with scholars such as Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, Elizabeth
Warren, and Lynn LoPucki. LoPucki reformulated the creditor bar-
gain model’s characterization of secured credit as an agreement
between the debtor, secured creditor, and unsecured creditor as an
“agreement between [debtor] and [secured creditor] that [the un-
secured creditor] take nothing.”67 To the extent that secured
creditors recover despite the injury to involuntary creditors, it com-
pounds the already existing injury done to third parties.68
Another charge leveled at secured credit is that it may encourage
the lender to behave badly. While proponents of secured credit
have posited that it encourages efficient monitoring of debtors,
Bebchuck and Fried have suggested the opposite: that security is
used in place of actual monitoring or efficient loan covenants, the
latter of which may accurately reflect the true bargain between the
parties and which the creditor may not effectively police.69 If a
lender knows that a security interest protects its investment, the ex-
istence or non-existence of tort victims does not change its recovery
if the debtor becomes insolvent; therefore, it is not motivated to
encourage the debtor to take precautions to limit its tort expo-
sure.70 Furthermore, secured credit also involves increased
contracting costs, which may discourage larger firms that have ac-
cess to unsecured credit from using secured debt.71
Other scholars critical of secured credit have argued that Article
9 unfairly redistributes wealth from involuntary creditors—and tort
65. Id.
66. See Leebron, supra note 49, at 1565–69 (1991) (discussing the role that limited liabil-
ity plays in protecting investors from tort liability).
67. See generally Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2; Warren, supra note 2; see also LoPucki, supra
note 9, at 1899.
68. LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1917 (“Article 9 is highly complex, unintuitive, and notori-
ously deceptive. In order to protect secured creditors, it rejects what are, for anyone other
than an expert in Article 9, basic principles of justice.”).
69. Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 899–902.
70. Id. at 898–99.
71. Id. at 877 (discussing how establishing a “priority right” can increase transaction
costs; see generally Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1997). Mann’s article begins with a telling quote from a corporate president: “I would say
that there’s a lower cost in an unsecured situation because of all the brain damage in going
out and getting appraisals and all that other bullshit [in a secured situation], where in an
unsecured deal you just do the deal and you get the money . . . .” Id. at 625.
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victims in particular—to secured creditors.72 The most common
call for reform of the secured credit system that accounts for invol-
untary creditors is to give those creditors super-priority over
secured creditors.73 Others have called for partial priority through
the institution of a carve-out in bankruptcy for involuntary creditors
that would reserve a certain percentage of value for them that
would otherwise go to pay secured claims.74 Bebchuck and Fried
have pointed out that various Chapter 11 mechanisms already oper-
ate to give secured creditors what amounts to partial priority. They
have suggested several alternatives to absolute priority, including a
carve-out and an adjustable priority scheme that would accommo-
date non-adjusting creditors like tort victims.75
Even some defenders of secured credit have been receptive to
super-priority for tort victims. Advocates of secured credit argue
that the current system is simply recognizing the inevitable, as Arti-
cle 9 reflects the bargain that creditors would choose to make for
themselves.76 Even “if the law denied debtors the power to prefer
some creditors over others through a system of security agreements,
a similar network of priority relationships could be expected to
emerge by consensual arrangement between creditors.”77 However,
defenders of secured credit, such as James J. White, have opined
that the question of whether secured credit is efficient is completely
irrelevant because banks and other secured lenders will not aban-
don absolute priority, and any alternative to Article 9 would be even
less efficient than the current arrangement due to higher transac-
tion costs.78
White dismisses both the possibility of elevating involuntary cred-
itors in priority and mandating that debtors procure insurance to
72. See generally Warren, supra note 2; LoPucki, supra note 9; Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2.
73. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REV. 311, 340 (1993) (“Ideally, nonconsensual claimants would have highest priority
in any sort of firm.”); Leebron, supra note 49, at 1650 (“In order to limit the externalities,
and hence the inefficiencies, created by the limitation of liability, tort claimants should be
given priority over both secured and unsecured financial creditors.”); Mark J. Roe, Commen-
tary on “On the Nature of Bankruptcy”: Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 227
(1989) (“A rule of priority for nonbargain creditors seems efficient.”); Painter, supra note 11,
at 1081 (“Tort-claim superpriority over secured creditors is, therefore, the most efficient and
equitable solution.”).
74. See, e.g., Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2; Memorandum from Professor Elizabeth Warren,
Harvard Law School, to the Council of the American Law Institute regarding “Article 9 Set
Aside for Unsecured Creditors” (Apr. 25, 1996), reprinted in UCC Bull., Oct. 1996, at 1.
75. Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 904–11.
76. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1164.
77. Id. at 1157.
78. James J. White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089, 2089–91
(1994).
608 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:3
protect such claimants ex ante as having “evil consequences,” includ-
ing the ultimate ruination of secured credit.79 He argues that
ensuring payment for involuntary creditors would cause secured
debtors to seek alternative ways to ensure full payment outside of
Article 9.80 White concludes that Article 9 correctly ignored invol-
untary creditors and that equitable concerns in favor of certainty
are “the true way.”81 The idea of granting super-priority to involun-
tary creditors does pose a challenge to the pre-debate defense of
Article 9 as incentivizing lending to risky borrowers, since lenders
may not want to extend credit if they know the claims of tort victims
may impair their claim to the collateral.82
C. Conclusion: The State of the Debate
Nonetheless, the debate over secured credit remains unresolved.
Defenders of Article 9 maintain that many companies would not be
able to obtain financing at all without secured credit; as a result,
any change in the priority system would negatively influence the
availability of credit and cause the eventual downfall of Article 9 as
an institution.83 Critics of the current system have noted that the
available empirical evidence does not indicate that any of these con-
sequences would actually materialize if involuntary creditors—tort
victims in particular—received super-priority or partial priority
ahead of secured creditors.
New commercial realities that led to the global financial crisis,
such as asset securitization and other forms of risky debt packaging,
have reignited concerns about creditor priorities. As Scott points
out, secured lenders are much more likely to be aware of and even
participate in business decisions—including those decisions that
were profitable in the short term and devastating in the long term,
79. Id. at 2099–2101.
80. Id. at 2099.
81. Id. at 2096, 2102. Kenneth Klee described the reaction to Warren’s proposal to give
super-priority to involuntary creditors as “hysterical efforts to entrench wealth in the hands of
banks, insurance companies, and finance companies at the expense of tort creditors, tax
creditors, environmental creditors, and, perhaps, employees and trade creditors.” Kenneth
N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte In Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1997).
82. See White, supra note 78, at 2099 (“To grant priority to tort claimants, retirees or
others in Article 9 is to take a step toward its abolition. Once the competitors to the Article 9
security interest become sufficiently numerous, they will stimulate secured creditors to do
exactly what they would do if Article 9 were repealed, namely to find alternative modes of
priority . . .”).
83. See id.
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such as asset securitization.84 Thus, giving those creditors priority
over tort victims rewards bad behavior at the expense of injured
parties. Then again, it may be that those firms that are mostly likely
to have a high number of involuntary creditors tend not to use se-
cured debt.85 This may not be optimal since secured lending could
serve an important monitoring function and be useful in curtailing
risky behavior.86 The imposition of tort victim super-priority might
actually encourage secured lending, as it might incentivize com-
mercial lenders to secure their place in line if they know certain
parties’ claims will take precedence in the event of the debtor’s
insolvency.
Ultimately, because both sides of the debate lack empirical sup-
port, examining areas of the law which structure creditor priority
differently is useful. Maritime law has prioritized certain involun-
tary creditors for centuries without any disastrous consequences to
credit markets. Indeed, while companies in non-maritime indus-
tries have traditionally had limited access to secured credit, the
shipping industry—also subject to high levels of tort exposure and
potentially devastating environmental fines—has had no such diffi-
culty. In fact, secured debt has traditionally been and continues to
be the primary source of financing in the maritime context.
II. TORT CLAIM PRIORITIES UNDER MARITIME LAW
The maritime industry is a working example of how giving super-
priority to tort victims would not necessarily make credit unavaila-
ble to potential borrowers who have liquidity problems or who
otherwise do not have access to large amounts of ready cash. The
ocean-faring industries do not appear to suffer a lack of potential
lenders and creditors, secured or unsecured, despite the fact that
they are high-risk industries that are very sensitive to market condi-
tions and subject to a variety of external and internal risks.87
Further, much of the scholarly debate over secured credit has fo-
cused on giving tort victims priority or partial priority under Article
9, Maritime law gives super-priority to tort victims by way of an in
rem action against a vessel. This Part considers the treatment of tort
victims under maritime law. The following Part examines whether
the general commercial context could integrate that treatment.
84. See Scott, supra note 34, at 948.
85. See Listoken, supra note 14, at 1044.
86. See Scott, supra note 34, at 948.
87. ALAN BRANCH & MARTIN STOPFORD, MARITIME ECONOMICS 200 (2013).
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A. The Maritime Lien
Under U.S. maritime law, several classes of involuntary creditors
have the highest priority under the maritime lien. There are two
broad categories of these liens: first is the preferred maritime lien,
which tort victims, wage claimants, contract-based claims receive for
services to the vessel (“necessaries”) pre-dating preferred ship mort-
gages, claims for general average,88 and salvage providers.89 Second
are preferred ship mortgages that post-date the preferred maritime
liens.90 Indeed, there is one type of secured creditor in nearly every
in rem action: the holder of a preferred ship mortgage.91 Although
Article 9 does not apply to maritime in rem actions, preferred ship
mortgages must be properly recorded in accordance with federal
law, and commercial banks follow Article 9 filing requirements to
ensure that their claim has priority if the vessel owner becomes
bankrupt.92
88. General average is an equitable rule analogous to that of contribution—when losses
or debts are incurred during a voyage that benefit all parties to the venture, all parties will
share in responsibility for the loss or debt. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the
Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV.
155, 171–72 (1989) (comparing the situation on the eve of corporation bankruptcy to an
event giving rise to general average). The simplest example is jettison, when cargo must be
thrown overboard to prevent the ship sinking. The parties responsible for that loss include
the vessel owner, the charterer, and the crew, as “what is given for the benefit of all should be
made good by the contribution of all.” J. Lowell, General Average, 9 HARV. L. REV. 185, 187
(1895). Note that it is possible to contractually waive or subordinate a maritime lien—and
this is often a standard request of charterers and vessel owners when contracting for ser-
vices—but one must alert the other party to clauses to that effect in order to be valid. See 46
U.S.C.A. § 31305; 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 9-4 (4th ed.
2004). Related, some debate whether foreign parties can use choice of law clauses in con-
tracts in order to invoke American law and obtain a maritime lien for necessaries—which is
only recognized in the US. See generally Charles S. Donovan, Picking the Shipowner’s Poison—
Choice of Law Clauses and Maritime Liens, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 185 (2001); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
89. Salvage providers engage in the recovery of a vessel, its cargo, or any part of either
after the vessel has been wrecked, run aground, or in some other way incapacitated. Bank-
ruptcy is sometimes analogized to salvage, with the aim of bankruptcy being first “to salvage
whatever can be salvaged,” with pro rata distribution of the remaining assets to those who
“entrusted their cargo to the now-failing” vessel. Warren, supra note 2, at 1389–90. The ex-
ception to this approach is the Article 9 full priority rule. See id. at 1389.
90. Raymond P. Hayden & Kipp C. Leland, The Uniqueness of Admiralty and Maritime Law:
The Unique Nature of Maritime Liens, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (2005).
91. Technically, a maritime lienholder is also a secured creditor, but holders of pre-
ferred ship and fleet mortgages are almost always secured creditors for the purposes of
Article 9 as well, as banks insist on filing UCC financing statements over the mortgaged
vessels.
92. See 46 U.S.C. § 31322(d). Courts have held that UCC securing interests are pre-
empted by maritime liens; see, e.g, Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Sheldon, 751 F. Supp. 26, 28–30
(E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Maritime liens are creatures of civil law and have an impressive
historical pedigree—the first written mention of what we now call
the maritime lien appears in the 6th century CE Digest of Justinian,
and some maritime law scholars have argued that the lien actually
dates back an additional thousand years to the Rhodian sea law of
the 8th century BCE.93 The maritime lien is not possessory, like a
mechanic’s lien, but gives the holder an inchoate property right in
a vessel or other maritime property that the filing of an action in
rem perfects.94 The lien arises as of right the moment that the un-
derlying debt is incurred, and only the payment of the obligation
or, in the event of non-payment, judicial sale of the vessel extin-
guishes the lien.95
Some refer to maritime liens as “secret liens”96 because, unlike
secured claims or possessory liens, maritime liens do not need to be
recorded.97 Historically, recordation was not feasible. In the course
of a single voyage, a vessel may sail halfway around the world and
accrue maritime liens in half a dozen countries.98 Additionally, mar-
itime liens arise the very moment that the lienholder provides
services or the vessel’s actions injure the person, and only the pay-
ment of the underlying debt or judicial sale can discharge the
lien.99 It is possible to file a lien with the proper authority in the
country where the vessel is registered, but such filing is at the dis-
cretion of the lienholder, and failure to file has no effect on the
either the claim or its priority with respect to other liens against the
same vessel.100
Further, only paying the underlying debt can satisfy a lien or,
failing that, judicial sale of the vessel. The sale of a vessel by its
owner does not extinguish the lien—indeed, because of the doc-
trine of personification, the lien remains with the vessel. The
difficulty in discharging the liens makes U.S. maritime liens unique
and controversial among maritime nations, as the idea that the
maritime lien can be asserted against a vessel even when the
93. Alexander McCabe, Demosthenes and the Origins of the Maritime Lien, 42 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 581, 581 (2012).
94. Michael J. Ende, Adrift on a Sea of Red Ink: The Status of Maritime Liens in Bankruptcy,
11 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 573, 575 (1988).
95. See William Tetley, Arrest, Attachment, and Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 1895, 1925, 1929–37 (1999).
96. See Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon Steamship Ltd. (The Pacific Cedar), 290 U.S.
117, 125 (1933). Note that, although filing perfects Article 9 security interests, maritime liens
are not the only “secret liens.”
97. Tetley, supra note 95, at 1930.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867).
100. See George Rutherglen, The Contemporary Justification for Maritime Arrest and Attach-
ment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 549–50 (1989).
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owner—the source of the wrongdoing—has changed runs counter
to notions of equity.101 Indeed, the United States alone makes the
vessel, instead of its owners, responsible to maritime lienholders.102
To be clear, vessel owners may be personally liable for other debts
they incur, but under the doctrine of personification only the vessel
itself is liable for maritime liens, not its owners.
The legal fiction of personification is the lien’s underlying pre-
mise: the vessel itself is treated as a legal person who may incur
liabilities and debts during the course of its voyages, just as an indi-
vidual could.103 Although this approach seems odd, it reflects a time
when creditors needed the ability to seize the vessel at any point
when it reentered a nearby port, regardless of any changes in own-
ership subsequent to the incursion of the debt.104 Historically, a
vessel could avoid liability by simply sailing away.105 The arrest of
the vessel to pay maritime liens developed in response to the vessel
escaping.106 Before the invention of satellites and global tracking
devices, one could not reliably track a vessel once it had departed
from port, so injured parties needed a way to ensure that they were
paid before the vessel vanished, possibly never to be seen again.
With respect to tort claimants, the vessel should be made to com-
pensate to victims, as it was the means by which the injury was
inflicted. As Justice Story explained:
The ship is also by the general maritime law held responsible
for the torts and misconduct of the master and crew thereof,
101. See Martin Davies, In Defense of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification, 75
TUL. L. REV. 337, 339 (2000). The alternative justification for the in rem action used in other
jurisdictions is the procedural theory, which “conceives of the action in rem as simply a device
for forcing the appearance of the shipowner in personam rather than truly as an action against
the ship itself.” Id. at 341.
102. See id. at 339.
103. Id. at 337. In a 1902 opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes poetically explained the
doctrine of personification.
A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is preserved.
Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron—an ordinary piece
of personal property—as distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject only to
mechanics’ liens created by state law and enforceable in the state courts. In the bap-
tism of launching she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the
water she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires
a personality of her own; becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for
her obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, and be sued in
her own name. Her owner’s agents may not be her agents, and her agents may not be
her owner’s agents.
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 438 (1902).
104. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 88, at § 9-1.
105. The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 122–23 (1898).
106. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 88, at § 9-1.
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whether arising from negligence or a wilful [sic] disregard of
duty; as for example, in cases of collision and other wrongs
done upon the high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, upon the general policy of that law,
which looks to the instrument itself, used as the means of the
mischief, as the best and surest pledge for the compensation
and indemnity to the injured party.107
The purpose of the maritime lien, including the lien for a mari-
time tort, is two-fold: keeping vessels moving in commerce “while
not allowing them to escape their debts by sailing away.”108 The lien
was created as a form of protection for the flow of maritime com-
merce, as the holders of maritime liens are typically members of the
shipping industry such as sailors, stevedores, and shipwrights.109
These industry members were crucial to maintain the uninter-
rupted continuation of trade. The policy of keeping the ship in
service is a consistent theme throughout the rules of maritime in-
debtedness. “The whole object . . . is to furnish wings and legs to
the forfeited hull, to get back [to sea] for the benefit of all con-
cerned; that is, to complete [the] voyage.”110 These objectives
mirror the motivation behind the creation of Article 9: the non-
possessory security interest allows the debtor to use the collateral
without interruption of business while at the same time ensuring
repayment to the secured creditor.
1. The Priority Scheme
The Maritime Lien Act, which follows the traditional common
law ranking of maritime liens, sets out the order of lien priorities
under U.S. maritime law.111 The priority rules are flexible—federal
courts acting in their maritime jurisdiction have considerable equi-
table powers and may subordinate otherwise superior claims when
it appears that the debtor and secured lender are cooperating to
107. The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 234 (1844).
108. In re Riffe Petroleum Co., 601 F.2d 1385, 1389 (10th Cir. 1979).
109. See Robert Force, A.N. Yiannopoulos & Martin Davies, Marine Insurance, in 2 ADMI-
RALTY AND MARITIME LAW 205, 262 (Thomas Schoenbaum ed., 4th ed. 2004).
110. GRANT GILMORE, JR. & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 586–89 (2d ed.
1975).
111. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343.
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shield the vessel from maritime liens.112 Generally, preferred mari-
time liens have priority over preferred ship mortgages, and all
maritime liens have priority over perfected Article 9 secured claims
in the maritime in rem action.113 The Maritime Lien Act ranks three
categories of creditors in descending order of priority: preferred
maritime liens, preferred ship mortgages, and maritime liens for
necessaries.114 All other non-maritime claims, including the claims
of secured lenders, follow.115
Within the category of preferred maritime liens, the general mar-
itime law ranks seamen’s wages first, then salvage claims, tort
claims, and trade creditor claims for necessaries (including repairs,
supplies, towage, wharfage, and pilotage).116 The Supreme Court in
The John G. Stevens observed that the reason for giving tort victims
preferred status over liens for necessaries (and, by extension, all
other creditors with inferior priority, including non-maritime credi-
tors) is that everyone who has contributed to the vessel is, in a way,
responsible for the vessel’s wrongdoing:
All the interests, existing at the time of the collision, in the
offending vessel, whether by way of part ownership, of mort-
gage, of bottomry bond, or of other maritime lien for repairs
or supplies, arising out of contract with the owners or agents
of the vessel, are parts of the vessel herself, and as such are
bound by and responsible for her wrongful acts.117
In other words, although the repair provider, secured creditor, or
unsecured creditor have not directly done wrong, each of them
contributed to the business of the debtor, which in turn was the
cause of the tort victim’s injury. Therefore, they are responsible for
absorbing some of the tort victim’s loss.
112. As, for example, in the case of a fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., Custom Fuel Services v.
Lombas Industries, 805 F.2d 561, 562–66 (5th Cir. 1986) in which the court equitably subor-
dinated the claim of a prior-in-time secured creditor (the holder of a preferred ship
mortgage) to that of a maritime lien for necessaries a charterer held. The court found that
the debtor and the secured creditor had conspired to transfer title to a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of the secured creditor, making it the nominal owner in return for a preferred ship
mortgage in amount equal to value of vessel. Id. at 566. In the court’s view, this was done to
insulate the vessel from maritime liens. Id.
113. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343.
114. Hayden & Leland, supra note 90, at 1248.
115. Id.
116. General maritime law, which is federal common law, rather than statute, sets outs
this ranking. See id. at 1244–45.
117. The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 123 (1898).
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2. Ranking of Creditors within Priority Classes:
Last in Time, First in Right
The ranking of creditors within the same priority classes in mari-
time law is the reverse of the ranking of creditors under Article 9.
The UCC ranks secured creditors “first in time, first in right,” so
that the creditor who first perfected his secured claim by following
Article 9’s filing procedures will be paid ahead of other secured
creditors.118 By contrast, priority among maritime lienholders is
“last in time, first in right,” with the most recent claimant being
paid first.119 This ranking system is traditionally defended using the
proprietary interest theory, which is that the lienholder’s interest,
like other proprietary interests in a vessel, is subject to all maritime
perils, including subsequent torts, collisions, and repairs.120
A more satisfactory explanation is that, traditionally, the vessel
was the only security for a marine service provider’s claim.121 Thus,
only the assurance that their potential claim would trump any ex-
isting claims guaranteed that service providers would perform their
duties.122 Another explanation is that those who provided services
to the vessel most recently are also those most directly responsible
for the vessel’s seaworthiness and ability to be sold.123 Yet another
explanation is that, as a practical matter, maritime liens are subject
to laches, and a lienholder must exercise some degree of diligence
to maintain a lien when the vessel has been sold.124 Thus, the last in
time rule may incentivize lienholders to seek timely payment to
avoid losing the lien altogether.
The order of lien priority under Article 9 is directly opposed to
the maritime system in part because Article 9 is a notice-based sys-
tem. In order to ensure that secured creditors comply with the
filing requirements of Article 9, the creditor who fails to do so in a
118. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1); cf. Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument
for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REV. 11, 14–15 (1996) (“In American
law, the central principle for determining priority between competing lienholders is the sim-
ple notion that first in time is first in right”).
119. Hayden & Leland, supra note 90, at 1249–50.
120. The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. at 120; Note, Priorities of Maritime Liens, 69 HARV. L. REV.
525 (1956).
121. Note, supra 120, at 528.
122. Id.
123. See The De Smet, 10 F. 483, 490 (E.D. La. 1881) (“The reason for the rule that
maritime lines are entitled to priority in the inverse order in which they attach, is that in the
case of contracts the benefit rendered at the latest hour preserves the res to satisfy the earlier
claims, and thereby earns a superior equity in respect to the common fund.”).
124. Circuit courts approach the laches determination in different ways. One example is
the Fifth Circuit’s requirement of “reasonable diligence.” See, e.g., Merchants & Marine Bank
v. The T.E. Wells, 289 F.2d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1961).
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timely manner may find that another creditor who filed first trumps
his priority even if the first-filing debtor actually extended credit
later in time. Many have heavily criticized the maritime ordering
system because it is incongruent with Article 9’s approach and be-
cause it works to the prejudice of creditors with older claims.
3. The In Rem Action
An in rem action perfects and enforces maritime liens.125 An in
rem action is a legal action against property, in contrast to an action
in personam, which is against the person. A maritime lien holder is
entitled to bring an action in rem to perfect its lien by filing the
action in the federal district court whose jurisdiction encompassed
the location where the property to be seized.126 Rule C of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Admiralty
(the Supplemental Rules) sets forth this procedure and requires
that the lienholder provide a verified complaint that describes the
property to be seized with reasonable particularity and states that it
is located within the district.127
Once the lienholder has filed a complaint meeting these require-
ments, the court will issue a warrant, which the United States
Marshals carry out for the arrest of the vessel.128 Depending on the
vessel’s location at the time of its arrest, it could remain in the cus-
tody of the Marshals, or, if the vessel was in a repair yard or other
facility, it could remain at the wharf. The Marshals or the wharf
owners’ expenses are custodia legis, i.e. legal costs that proceeds
from the sale must pay.129
Other parties with an ownership claim in the seized vessel have
fourteen days from the initiation of the in rem action to file a state-
ment of interest indicating that they also have a claim to the
125. Douglas Lind, Pragmatism and Anthropomorphism: Reconceiving the Doctrine of the Person-
ality of the Ship, 22 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 39, 46 (2010).
126. Article III of the United States Constitution gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over maritime law, although there are limited exceptions by way of the “savings to suitors”
clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (now found in the United States Code), which allows
seamen to bring common law claims in state court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 444–46 (2001). This exception
does not apply to in rem actions, which remain exclusively with federal courts sitting in admi-
ralty jurisdiction. See Lewis, supra at 446.
127. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. C(2).
128. Id. at C(3)(a).
129. See, e.g., Geoffrey H. Longenecker, Comment, Developments in the Law of Maritime
Liens, 45 TUL. L. REV. 574, 577–78 (1971).
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proceeds of the vessel’s sale.130 Under Rule E of the Supplemental
Rules, the vessel owner is entitled to a prompt hearing in which to
challenge the claimed lien, including a challenge based on no valid
lien.131 The maritime in rem action is subject to two particular safe-
guards. First, the courts generally require an in rem plaintiff to post
a bond as security with the court.132 Second, the vessel owner can
counterclaim an in rem action for wrongful seizure and, if success-
ful, can recover custodia legis and attorney’s fees, as well as any lost
profits suffered as a result of taking the vessel out of commerce.133
There are thus significant financial consequences to bringing an in
rem action when there is no valid lien to be enforced.
The in rem action coupled with the maritime lien provides excep-
tionally an powerful tool for parties injured while providing services
to vessels. The arrest of the vessel pursuant to the filing of the in rem
action, which has the potential to take the vessel out of commerce,
incentivizes maritime debtors to resolve claims as quickly as
possible.
B. Priority in Bankruptcy
A long-standing conflict exists between bankruptcy law and admi-
ralty law, particularly with respect to maritime liens.134 Article 9
applies to bankruptcy proceedings involving maritime corporate ac-
tors, and, under that priority system, maritime lienholders are
unsecured creditors. Thus, a bankruptcy court can sell off vessels
burdened with maritime liens as assets of the debtor and distribute
the proceeds according to Article 9. The inconsistency in the treat-
ment of tort victims and other maritime lienholders in and out of
bankruptcy is the result of a conflict between maritime and bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. However, in most cases the sale of a vessel in a
bankruptcy proceeding does not extinguish any maritime liens.
130. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. C(6)(a). Local rules may provide for a different period where
notice by publication is required after the property is released on bond. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP.
E(4). In the Eastern District of Louisiana, for example, parties have twenty-one days to file a
Statement of Interest if notice of the arrest is required to be made by publication. E.D. La.
LAR 64.1.
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(4)(f).
132. Id. at E(5)(a).
133. Custodia legis fees include the cost of holding the vessel, which can be considerable.
The U.S. Marshals service requires a minimum deposit of $10,000 to arrest a vessel, and
private wharfage and dockage fees can be even higher. See SEAFARERS’ RIGHTS, Ship Arrest for
Seafarers’ Wages in the United States of America 4.1, available at http://seafarersrights.org/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/USA.SUBJECTGUIDE.ARRESTFORSEAFARERSWAGES_
2013_ENG.pdf.
134. See Ende, supra note 94, at 574.
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Most courts have held that only a judicial sale of the vessel by a
court sitting in admiralty jurisdiction can free the vessel of maritime
liens.135 As a result, secured creditors can be highly motivated to
negotiate with maritime lienholders in bankruptcy.136 For example,
in 2011, General Maritime (“GenMar”), owner of one of the largest
fleets of crude oil tanker vessels in the world, entered Chapter 11
bankruptcy.137 Most of GenMar’s value was in its thirty-three tank-
ers, and, although the maritime lienholders were subordinate to
the secured lenders in priority, their liens on the vessels would have
survived bankruptcy if the assets were insufficient to pay their
claims after the secured claims were satisfied.
Mindful of this, the secured lenders included the maritime
lienholders in their plan to keep GenMar in business. Those se-
cured creditors—including first preferred ship mortgage holders,
conventional lenders, and a significant shareholder—negotiated a
plan of reorganization that included lockup arrangements with the
existing lenders and a debtor-in-possession financing from one of
the secured creditors.138 As part of this plan, involuntary creditors
who had supplied GenMar vessels were paid with bankruptcy court
approval.139 The secured creditors did not view this as shrinking the
pool of assets available to creditors generally. Instead, they did this
to prevent the involuntary creditors from initiating in rem actions to
satisfy their maritime liens after the bankruptcy proceedings were
complete.140 This cooperation between secured creditors and
lienholders may demonstrate the continuing power of the maritime
priority system, even in bankruptcy. Additionally, the inability of
bankruptcy proceedings to discharge maritime liens could lessen
135. See id. Case law supports the position that only an admiralty court may sell a vessel
free of maritime liens. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 38 B.R. 987,
998 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 585 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (holding that “a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of
enforcing a claim—namely, an action against the debtor in personam—while leaving intact
another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”). But cf. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459,
462–63 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that chapter 11 plan of reorganization can modify lien,
force holder to accept indubitable equivalent, or even extinguish lien); In re Millennium Sea
Carriers, Inc., 275 B.R. 690, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“bankruptcy courts are perfectly capable of
adjudicating maritime lien claims”).
136. Ende, supra note 94, at 577–78.
137. Stephen T. Whelan & Marc E. Richards, That Sinking Feeling: Lessons Gleaned from
Recent Maritime Bankruptcies, ABF JOURNAL, March 2013, available at http://www.blankrome
.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=3032.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. (“This was a strategic decision: rather than being viewed as siphoning cash
from the debtors, this approach was meant to prevent vendors, with liens under maritime
law, from exercising their remedies, arresting the related vessels and hence endangering the
opportunity for an effective reorganization.”).
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the incidence of debtors choosing to liquidate their own assets
outside of bankruptcy in order to pay off “favored” creditors.141
C. Protection & Indemnity Insurance
Any discussion of a shift away from secured creditor priority
raises the question of how such creditors would respond to protect
their investment. One of the responses in the maritime industry is
that secured creditors demand proof of Protection and Indemnity
(P&I) insurance from potential borrowers.142 P&I insurance is a
unique feature of the maritime industry that initially evolved in re-
sponse to the historical unreliability of traditional marine
insurers.143 The uncertainty of losses was a serious problem for ship-
ping companies given the potential costs of maritime liens, the
disruption of the industry by war and piracy, and, later, the heavy
fines imposed for violation of marine pollution laws.144 Modern P&I
policies generally cover claims for personal injury and death, pas-
senger liability (including luggage), liability for cargo loss and
damage, collision, wreck removal, pollution, loss of property on the
insured vessel, damage to fixed and floating objects, towage, and
general average.145
Unlike typical marine insurance, which can cover damage to the
vessel and cargo, “clubs,” rather than insurance companies, issue
P&I insurance. These clubs are non-profit organizations composed
of vessel owners and operators, charterers, and other industry ac-
tors; thus, they are not beholden to their shareholders the way
insurance companies are.146 The clubs are incorporated so that
members do not seek to enforce their rights against each other, but
141. See Lynn LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve-Out Apply Only in Bankruptcy?, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1483, 1494 (1997) (arguing that any change in the creditor priority struc-
ture must apply both inside and outside of bankruptcy, lest debtors liquidate their own assets
and sell them to favored creditors outside the bankruptcy preference period).
142. Anecdotal evidence suggests that maritime lenders do not always require P&I insur-
ance from smaller borrowers such as LLCs that own two or three vessels that they charter to
other companies.
143. See DAVID SEMARK, P&I CLUBS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1–7 (2013).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 1. In the U.S., the right of vessels owners to insure themselves against their
own negligence has long been upheld. See, e.g., Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of New York v.
Merchants’ Transp. Co., 15 F.2d 946, 948 (1926) (citing Waters v. Merchants’ Louisville In-
surance Co., 36 U.S. 213 (1837)).
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against the corporation.147 A management company whose sole cli-
ent is the club generally supervises the members.148 All members of
the P&I clubs contribute to a common pool to pay out the claims of
involuntary creditors, provided those claims are settled in accor-
dance with club rules.149 P&I clubs also do not pay any claims until
the member has paid the claimant. There is a tribunal process to
determine whether the claims falls within club rules.150
Ordinarily, insurance has the undesirable effect of disincentiviz-
ing the insured from taking the proper precautions to avoid
accidents, which leads to moral hazard.151 Since the members of
P&I clubs, unlike traditional insurance companies, have the benefit
of expertise in the field, they know whether the actions of a mem-
ber fall within an acceptable range of precautionary activities or
whether those actions are outside the acceptable range. If they are
outside the acceptable range, the club denies P&I coverage, and
the actor alone bears cost of those actions. Thus, P&I clubs re-
present an example of private rulemaking or ordering that requires
that the debtor, along with a group of similarly situation actors,
bear the risk of loss.152
D. The Availability of Secured Credit in the Maritime Context
Giving priority to involuntary creditors has not frozen the credit
available to maritime borrowers. To the contrary, the shipping in-
dustry has historically suffered from a surplus of available credit,
even for under-capitalized shipowners.153 In the mid-1990s, banks
even complained about the competition in providing financing to
the shipping industry.154 The cost of doing business on the open
water is very high, with shipping vessels sometimes costing hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, and the shipping market can be
147. SEMARK, supra note 143, at 7.
148. Id. at 9, 12.
149. See John D. Kimball, The Central Role of P&I Insurance in Maritime Law, 87 TUL. L. REV.
1147, 1148–49. (2013).
150. SEMARK, supra note 143, at 9, 12.
151. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 537
(1986). Moral hazard is a situation in which a party fails to take steps to minimize the possibil-
ity of harm because it does not bear the risk of loss. Id.; see generally Tom Baker, On the
Geneology of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral
Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and
Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979).
152. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 327 (2002).
153. BRANCH & STOPFORD, supra note 86, at 200.
154. Id. at 201.
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volatile. As a result, maritime finance tends to be fairly conserva-
tive—there are few publicly traded shipping companies, and most
vessels are purchased either with equity, debt finance, or a blend of
the two.155
Debt financing is the most common source of credit to vessel
owners and typically takes the form of a term loan from a commer-
cial bank.156 More than one hundred banks extend credit to the
maritime industry, and many of these banks do so on a secured
basis and have monitoring capabilities.157 It is possible that secured
credit is the primary form of financing in the maritime industry
because the security device the creditors employ—the preferred
ship mortgage—has a priority position in the in rem action, al-
though it is behind involuntary creditors.158 As a result, these banks
already have systems in place to account the debtors’ potential sig-
nificant tort exposure, which has super-priority in an in rem action
against the vessels being built, purchased, or leased back. The mari-
time industry thus offers an extreme example of a setting in which
risk is high and most financing is through secured debt, even
though involuntary creditors may be repaid before secured debt
out of the sale of the debtor’s personal property. Of course, most
maritime financing is secured due to the priority scheme. It is possi-
ble that the priority of maritime liens in the in rem action deters
unsecured creditors, since most of the value of maritime companies
is in the vessels.
None of this is to say that the shipping industry has never suf-
fered from a lack of ready credit. However, the reasons for dry
spells in the maritime credit market relate to the volatility of the
155. Id. at 211–16.
156. Id. at 216–18.
157. Id. at 229.
158. See Bruce G. Paulsen, Paula Odysseos & Kassandra L. Savicki, New Horizons: An Analy-
sis of Public Markets Financing of Shipping Ventures and the Impending Wave of Shipping Securities
Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (1997). As Bebchuck and Fried explain, the pattern of
credit observed in the 1990’s suggested that many companies borrow from sophisticated
creditors on an exclusively unsecured basis. See Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2, at 854 n.4 (citing
John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small Business
Community, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 379, 387 (1989) (reporting that only about
fifty percent of small businesses with commercial bank loans in study provided assets of the
business as collateral)); James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring
Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 40 n.10 (1992) (noting that few firms with public unsecured
debt borrow from banks on secured basis); LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1925 n. 148 (reporting
Federal Reserve statistics on lending by commercial banks to the effect that only 42.7% of
$41.2 billion in short-term loans were secured and only 64.7% of $3.7 billion in long-term
loans were secured).
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industry and the global markets, not maritime liens for tort claims
and their super-priority in the in rem action.159
Why has the maritime industry not scuttled its ancient lien system
in favor of the more pro-lending Article 9 treatment of involuntary
creditors? Why has it not done away with the in rem action that al-
lows involuntary creditors to seize vessels and keep them out of
commerce? Secured lenders in the maritime industry have not
called for such changes possibly because the current system is, in
fact, efficient. However, despite the evidence pointing towards the
ready availability of credit in the maritime context, no evidence
shows the impact of tort victims’ super-priority one way or the other
on the cost of credit. Secured financing may be offered at higher
rates in response to the lack of preferred treatment for the lenders.
However, as discussed in Part III infra, secured lenders demand
proof of insurance and negotiate strict loan covenants that cover
most tort claims before agreeing to lend, so increased credit prices
may not be the reality. These are additional costs to both the debtor
and lender, although, at least in the maritime context, these addi-
tional costs have not deterred secured lending.
This system’s success indicates that the maritime industry has
been able to allocate resources in such a way as to compensate for
negative externalities without impairing at least the availability of
secured credit. This is especially relevant to the Article 9 debates, as
a major criticism of giving tort victims priority is that this will make
it nearly impossible for borrowers with liquidity problems to obtain
credit, since no one would lend to such a company without the pro-
tection of security.160 The maritime industry offers proof that it is
possible to give super-priority to tort victims without freezing the
availability of credit.
159. See, e.g., Global Shipping Firms Cite Credit Crunch as Leading Challenge Facing Industry,
GENCO, http://www.genco.com/Logistics-Articles/article.php?aid=800705950 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2014). The lack of ready credit the global financial crisis caused was not changing
traditional maritime financing through secured debt, as “[d]espite a dearth of credit, 43
percent of [shipping company] respondents maintained that bank lending will remain their
primary source of funding over the next two years.” See also Standard & Poor’s, Declining Asset
Values Are Putting International Shipping Companies at Risk of Breaching Loan Covenants, RATINGS-
DIRECT, Dec. 7, 2011 (discussing how falling shipping rates and a potential oversupply of
vessels in the form of Chinese tanker ships combined with the global financial crisis acted to
restrict credit markets).
160. See White, supra note 78, at 2090 (rebutting arguments that Article 9’s priority rules
are inefficient by pointing out that any change to Article 9 could result in a reversion to the
pre-UCC disorganized state of security laws).
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III. MARITIME LAW AND THE DEBATE OVER SECURED CREDIT
The question, then, is whether and to what extent the treatment
of tort victims under the maritime priority system may shed light on
the debate over Article 9. Essentially, the maritime law example
shows that it is possible to give tort victims super-priority over se-
cured creditors without freezing the availability of secured credit.
This, in turn, undermines one of the primary arguments against
elevating the priority of tort victims. The real question may be
whether the maritime law system, or aspects of that system, holds up
outside of the maritime context. While the priority of tort victims
pursuant to a maritime lien has been a feature of the maritime
commercial landscape for much longer than Article 9 has existed,
unique aspects of the maritime industry might suggest that tort-vic-
tim priority would not be successful outside of that industry. While
it is not difficult to identify those aspects of maritime commerce
that offer special justification for tort-victim priority, it is difficult to
demonstrate that those aspects categorically rule out the adoption
of tort victim priority in the non-maritime context. There are, how-
ever, differences that bear mentioning, as well as problems in the
general commercial context that the maritime law example does
not necessarily address in a satisfactory way.
Any analysis of what lessons can be gleaned from the treatment
of creditors in maritime law must begin by acknowledging that, in
many ways, the maritime industry is sui generis. Shipping involves
the transportation of people and goods over the open water; thus, it
is subject to a number of potentially devastating sources of loss that
are not necessarily implicated in other industries. Moreover, mari-
time law developed separate from other commercial doctrines and
is the product of at least a thousand years of special relationships
between shipowners, seafarers, and sources of finance. Thus, what
works in the maritime context may not work outside of it. Yet the
maritime priority system does substantiate some arguments in favor
of secured credit while, at the same time, debunking some argu-
ments against giving some protection to involuntary creditors.
A. Incorporating Aspects of the Maritime System
Outside of the Maritime Context
Given the differences between maritime and non-maritime com-
mercial actors and tort victims, non-maritime commercial actors are
unlikely to adopt wholesale the maritime system. Still, it may be pos-
sible to follow the maritime example of giving super-priority to tort
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victims outside of bankruptcy. Giving tort victims super-priority or
partial priority is the most commonly advanced solution to the
problem of uncompensated tort victims.161 Some scholars have lim-
ited their arguments to bankruptcy, while others advocate a change
in involuntary creditor priority across the board.162 The maritime
approach is an example of tort victim super-priority across the
board, but because of the conflict between admiralty and bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, secured lenders maintain their Article 9 priority
status in bankruptcy proceedings, subject to tort claimants’ mari-
time liens. Thus, secured lenders are not only protected, but they
are also encouraged to actively monitor debtors to ensure that in-
voluntary creditor claims are paid in a timely manner while the
debtor company is still doing business so that the overall pool of
assets is maintained in bankruptcy. To effect a similar result in the
non-maritime context might be difficult, since it is a jurisdictional
conflict that allows maritime and Article 9 priority systems to coex-
ist, but the priority of creditors under maritime law at least provides
some concrete evidence that tort claim super-priority is workable
and does not necessarily cut off small business from secured credit.
Other aspects of the maritime law system, such as a stronger judg-
ment lien, might also protect the claims of tort victims.
1. Granting Super-Priority & Strengthening the Judgment Lien
The first step towards achieving full protection for tort victims is
to grant them super-priority, but a second step might be to
strengthen the power of the judgment lien. Currently, the debtor’s
collateral that is subject to the judgment lien varies from state to
state, as do the filing requirements.163 Once a tort claimant has ob-
tained a judgment in her favor, that judgment gives rise to a lien.
The lien may be superior to secured claims that are perfected after
the recording of the lien, but even if the lien does predate the se-
cured claim, it may not extend to the all of the debtor’s property
that is subject to the secured claim.164 In some states, the judgment
lien extends over all of the debtor’s real property, which makes it a
lien in rem, provided that the lien was recorded by filing a UCC
161. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2; Warren, supra note 2; Baird, supra note 2;
Adler, supra note 2; Uneasy Case 1, supra note 2.
162. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 12.
163. See 0130 SURV. 11, 50 State Survey: Real Property: Liens: Priority of Judgment Liens (2014).
164. See, e.g., Charles W. Hendricks, Offering Tort Victims Some Solace: Why States Should In-
corporate a 20% Set-Aside into Their Versions of Article 9, 104 COM. L. J. 265, 266–68 (1999).
SPRING 2015] A Sea Change in Creditor Priorities 625
filing statement in the appropriate records office.165 In other states,
because of the priority of secured debt, a valid mortgage or other
secured claim filed against that real property, even if filed after the
date of judgment, will prime the judgment lien.166 Thus, advocates
of tort victims who become aware of the mortgage are discouraged
from seeking to enforce the judgment lien.167
Perhaps even worse for tort claimants, many secured claims cover
the debtor’s present and after-acquired property, which means that
even property of the debtor that did not exist at the time that the
secured claim was perfected will be subject to the secured claim,
thus removing that property from the reach of a judgment lien.168
To correct this problem, granting the holder a security interest in
the same collateral that a secured creditor’s claim has would make
the judgment lien more powerful. This would happen if states fol-
lowed the example of Maine, whose judgment lien statute grants a
judgment creditor a lien over “proceeds of any disposition of the
property, real or personal . . . to the extent that a secured party
would have an interest in the proceeds.”169
In addition, making the judgment lien extend to the same collat-
eral as a secured creditor’s claim may serve an important
incentivizing function. In maritime law, the maritime lien covers an
identified vessel. Even though the secured lenders have a priority
claim over all of the debtor’s personal property, the vessels are
often the debtor’s most valuable asset.170 If it is true that secured
credit encourages institutional lenders to monitor their debtors
and to pressure them into making sensible business decisions, fi-
nancial consequences should promote this monitoring. Secured
creditors in the shipping industry monitor debtors closely in order
to ensure that the claims of involuntary creditors are paid promptly,
either through insurance or directly.171 Relatedly, an involuntary
creditor’s lien on the very property that secured creditors wish to
preserve may encourage the secured lenders to pay or push for set-
tlement of involuntary creditor claims, as the alternative is judicial
165. See 0130 SURV., supra note 163.
166. Id.
167. LoPucki, supra note 13, at 14–15.
168. See Hendricks, supra note 164, at 267 n.16.
169. 14 MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. § 1331(9).
170. Consider, e.g., that the container ships and tanker vessels can cost up to $125 mil-
lion, roughly the same as a jumbo jet. BRANCH & STOPFORD, supra note 86, at 200.
Additionally, the market for vessels can fluctuate wildly depending on market conditions. For
example, during the 1980s, demand for ship transportation rose so astronomically that ves-
sels were valued at up to 800% their original purchase price. Id. at 26.
171. See id. at 183–85.
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sale of the vessel.172 Direct intervention from the secured lenders,
who pay maritime liens and then ask for subrogation from the
lienholders if there is no insurance coverage, can accomplish these
settlements. As a result, they step into the shoes of the involuntary
creditor and guarantee that no party is ahead of the secured lender
in priority.173
However, even when the debtor does have sufficient unencum-
bered assets to pay a tort victim’s claim, the debtor may still employ
a number of strategies to prevent any payment. As discussed in Part
I.C, a company can recruit one of its secured debtors to place a
judicial hold on the execution of a tort judgment, or it can sell its
assets in such a way that it is both seller and buyer, such as in a sale-
leaseback.174 Yet this might be impossible if tort victims had priority
over secured creditors outside of bankruptcy. Thus, super-priority
and a stronger judgment lien might have the effect of both protect-
ing tort victims and preventing at least some forms of judgment
proofing.
2. Enforcing the Judgment Lien
The modern commercial debtor is just as capable of moving its
assets out of the grasp of involuntary creditors as yesterday’s vessel
owner once was.175 The in rem action is frequently cited, along with
maritime attachment, as one of the most powerful features of U.S.
maritime law.176 Giving this tool to involuntary creditors would pro-
vide strong incentives for debtors to take precautions against the
existence of involuntary creditors in the first place. However, the in
rem action should not be used to enforce a judgment lien. Even if it
172. See, e.g., Sasportes v. M/V Sol de Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1978); Wilkins
v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 153 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998); P. T. Perusahaan
Pelayaran Samudera Trikora Lloyd v. Salzachtal, 373 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. N.Y. 1974); Brock v.
S.S. Southampton, 231 F. Supp. 280 (D. Or. 1964).
173. See Sasportes, 581 F.2d at 1207.
174. LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1914.
175. This is particularly true for companies seeking to avoid mass tort liability. These
companies will create subsidiaries before bankruptcy in order to rid themselves of assets, as in
the case of W.R. Grace & Co., which was able to shield $3 billion in assets from asbestos
claimants through reorganization before they filed bankruptcy proceedings. John C.
Heenan, Graceful Maneuvering: Corporate Avoidance of Liability Through Bankruptcy and Corporate
Law, 65 MONT. L. REV. 99, 114–15 (2004); see also Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to
Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing, amongst others, Mansville Corporation’s 1982
bankruptcy filing); LoPucki, supra note 13; Lynn M. Lopucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A
Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998).
176. See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 542.
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is possible to seize all of a debtor’s assets, it would likely cause se-
vere disruptions in the debtor’s business. Although the business of
maritime debtors is disrupted when vessels are seized, a difference
seems to exist between seizing a moveable piece of property like a
vessel and seizing, for example, an entire grocery store and its in-
ventory. Additionally, the enforcement of judgment liens is already
an action in rem. Further, if tort victims had super-priority, such in
rem actions to enforce judgment liens would not be susceptible to
secured creditors’ intervening actions to preserve their superior
claim to the collateral.177
In maritime law, tort victims have super-priority outside of bank-
ruptcy while the Article 9 priority system applies once bankruptcy
proceedings have begun. This approach gives secured creditors
some assurance that their claims will be paid in the event of bank-
ruptcy. However, as discussed above, the fact that these two priority
systems apply to maritime debtors in different actions is a result of
jurisdictional conflicts between maritime and bankruptcy courts
and was not deliberately undertaken to provide priority to both tort
victims and secured creditors. Indeed, scholars have already dis-
cussed and dismissed the possibility of applying tort victim priority
only in bankruptcy and not outside of it (the reverse of what hap-
pens in maritime law).178 Super-priority inside of bankruptcy could
only encourage debtors to dispose of their assets to favored credi-
tors before bankruptcy proceedings took place.179 By contrast, it is
not clear whether super-priority outside of bankruptcy would only
be a better solution, since secured creditors might simply file for
involuntary bankruptcy in order to stay any in rem action judgment
lienholders instituted. The better approach is likely to be the appli-
cation one set of priority rules in and out of bankruptcy.
3. Protecting Debtors and Secured Creditors Through Insurance
and Limitation of Liability
A natural consequence of giving tort victims super-priority might
be lender reluctance to extend secured credit without some show-
ing that the debtor is adequately insured against potential tort
claims. Although many debtors do purchase some type of liability
insurance, in many cases the debtors are underinsured and, even
when they are not, general liability policies do not offer coverage
177. See supra Part I.
178. See LoPucki, supra note 141, at 1509–10.
179. Id.
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for intentional torts or activity that was within the policyholder’s
control.180 Furthermore, many liability policies include self-insured
retention (SIR) clauses, which require the insured to cover a cer-
tain amount of any claim before the policy is triggered.181 An
insolvent policyholder may be unable to pay the SIR.182 Bankruptcy
courts do not typically allow inability to pay to vitiate coverage alto-
gether, but the insurer will only be responsible for the amount of
coverage minus the SIR.183 Thus, the tort claimant must seek that
SIR amount from the debtor, who was unable to pay it in the first
place.184
LoPucki has suggested that, in addition to giving priority to invol-
untary creditors, requiring debtors to purchase insurance for
secured creditors could more fully protect creditors.185 This insur-
ance would operate like title insurance, with the insurer paying the
secured creditor’s claim against the debtor, whereupon it would be
subrogated to its rights in debt collection.186 This insurance would
not be mandatory but would be available for the secured creditor to
election and would presumably be something that creditors would
only wish to obtain if the debtor was at risk of tort liability.187
Block-Lieb has criticized LoPucki’s proposed secured creditor in-
surance as potentially creating inefficiencies under the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion.188 The Kaldor-Hicks criterion states that a result is
more efficient if those who are made better off by an action or cir-
cumstance could compensate those that are made worse off.189
Block-Lieb believes that LoPucki’s suggestion is inefficient under
this model because the increased number of involuntary creditors
paid in full might result in increased transaction costs and limited
credit availability.190 But Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires that a
180. Erin L. Webb, Bankruptcy Treatment of Self-Insured Retentions and Deductables, 22 INS.
COVERAGE LITIG. (2012), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/in
surance/articles/julyaug2012-bankruptcy-sirs-deductibles2.html#_edn2.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id.
183. See John F. O’Connor, Inusrance Coverage Settlements and the Rights of Excess Insurers, 62
MD. L. REV. 30, 37–38 (2003).
184. Webb, supra note 180, at 2.
185. LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1912–13
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REV. 1989,
2005–09 (1994).
189. JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 98 (1998). Scholars have criti-
cized the Kaldor-Hicks criterion itself as incapable of recognizing that equivalent amounts of
compensation do not always represent equivalent amounts of welfare. See William J. Baumol,
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 164–70 (2d ed. 1965).
190. Block-Lieb, supra note 188, at 2009.
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party made worse off by another party’s actions could be compen-
sated, not that they actually receive any compensation or that such
compensation is delivered in an efficient manner.191 Because se-
cured creditors’ self-insurance might compensate them for any part
of a secured claim lost to tort claim priority, such self-insurance
does not seem to be necessarily inconsistent with Kaldor-Hicks.192
Block-Lieb is concerned that self-insurance might give rise to moral
hazard, which in turn could create inefficiencies, and that secured
creditor insurance might be unavailable to many because of the
transaction costs and the uncertainty surrounding potential tort
claims.193 As discussed below, the maritime example deals with that
uncertainty by way of a limitation on liability.194
Another possible reaction of secured creditors to tort claim
super-priority is selling secured debt in credit-default swaps or other
asset securitization methods. To accomplish this, the secured
lender would take its secured claim and sell it to a credit protection
buyer for an upfront amount.195 The buyer then pays a set amount
periodically to the secured lender until the maturity of the swap or
until a default event, such as the debtor’s bankruptcy.196 This might
be a controversial move, given the role of credit default swaps in the
recent global financial crisis, but it is one potential step secured
lenders could take in response to tort claim super-priority.197 Unlike
purchasing insurance, however, credit default swaps might not re-
sult in higher transaction costs for the debtor. All of these
possibilities demonstrate that secured lenders have the ability to
protect their investments in ways that involuntary unsecured credi-
tors like tort claimants cannot.
The maritime model is an example of the onus for purchasing
insurance to cover potential tort claims resting with the debtor.
One problem with this option outside the maritime context is that
the cost could be prohibitive for smaller and mid-sized firms that
traditionally rely on secured credit.198 However, those firms may
191. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 58, at 17.
192. See id. at 16 (“We use efficiency . . . in the Kaldor-Hicks [ ] sense, in which a policy
change is said to be efficient if the winners from the change could compensate the losers . . .
whether or not there is actual compensation.”).
193. Block-Lieb, supra note 188, at 2007—08.
194. See infra Part III.B.2.
195. See Douglas B. Levene, Credit Default Swaps and Insider Trading, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
231, 233 (2012).
196. See id.
197. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Central-
ized Counterparies Must Have Access of Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49, 59–60
(2011).
198. See, e.g., White, supra note 78, at 2090.
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have less exposure to involuntary creditors than larger firms that
are more likely to use unsecured credit, and, accordingly, the
purchase of insurance may not be as costly for those smaller and
mid-sized firms.199 Further, if groups of debtors involved in the
same industry provided insurance, like P&I insurance, they could
also address the problem of moral hazard—that is, the tendency of
insurance to take the place of the debtor’s proper precautions—
that concerned Block-Lieb.200 P&I insurance is only available when
the club determines that a member took the proper precautions
but still failed to prevent injury.201 This is not unlike third-party gen-
eral liability insurance, which typically will not cover the insured
parties’ intentional or grossly negligent behavior, which may sug-
gest that moral hazard problems are also avoidable, at least to some
degree, in the context of debtor-purchased insurance.
Whatever type of insurance secured creditors might require,
however, insurance’s full payment of the claim would extinguish
the judgment lien or reduce it by the amount of coverage paid.
This treatment is consistent with the nature of a maritime lien,
which exists only as long as the debt remains unpaid and would also
prevent double-recovery for involuntary creditors. Further, as a pol-
icy matter, there are many benefits to implementing a change in
the law that ensures that as many debtor companies as possible have
sufficient liability insurance. Of course, the problem of cost re-
mains. It is true that small and midsize companies exist in the
maritime context, and they do obtain secured credit while main-
taining comprehensive insurance. However, comparing the
maritime industry cannot definitively answer the question of
whether the increased transaction and insurance costs that might
accompany tort claim super-priority would put secured credit out
for reach for small and midsize firms.
B. Comparison of Maritime and Non-Maritime Debtors
In order to evaluate whether conclusions about the debate over
the Article 9 priority scheme can be drawn from the maritime ex-
ample, it may be useful to compare maritime and non-maritime
companies. As discussed in Part II, tort claims traditionally receive
high priority as a preferred maritime lien because all other
199. See Listoken, supra note 14, at 1044.
200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103 (1985).
201. SEMARK, supra note 143, at 50.
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lienholders have contributed to the debtor’s business and are, in a
sense, responsible for the tort victim’s injury.202 In addition, mari-
time tort victims have higher priority than holders of contract-based
liens for necessaries because the former obligation arises out of a
legal duty without regard to any bargained-for liability.203 A mari-
time debtor cannot use contract to maneuver around duties the law
imposed upon it.
There does not seem to have been an economic or efficiency ra-
tionale behind the initial adoption of the rule, although there is a
lack of scholarship on the subject. Even so, an ex post efficiency
concern may justify the treatment of tort victims because it forces
shipowners to bear the cost of their own injurious activities. How-
ever, some important differences between the maritime and non-
maritime contexts may militate against the adoption of tort victim
super-priority outside of the maritime context, including: the
unique nature of the average maritime tort victim, the limitation of
tort liability for shipowner, the importance of vessels as assets, and
the taxation of maritime companies.
1. The Nature of Maritime and Non-Maritime Tort Victims
It is difficult, if not impossible, to characterize the “typical” tort
victim in a general commercial context. Depending on the type of
debtor, the average tort victim might be a slip and fall (grocery and
retail stores), a defrauded investor (securities brokers), or a tortu-
ous interference of contract claimant (construction companies and
subcontractors). Similarly, the nature of the maritime industry de-
termines the nature of maritime tort victims. In order for a court to
exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the incident must
have occurred in a maritime location and have had a nexus to tradi-
tional maritime operations.204 Although it is easy to see how
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 202 (1932) (citing The John G. Stevens, 170
U.S. 113, 122—23 (1898)). There is also a suggestion that tort claim priority over liens for
necessaries is an equitable rule based on the increased sympathy judges had for tort victims.
See Wentworth J. Marshall, Jr., Maritime Lien Priority, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 577, 580
(1960); Edward L. Willard, Priorities Among Maritime Liens, 16 CORNELL L. Q. 522, 527 (1930)
(“There is a visceral reaction for the poor fellow who was hit in the face over the man who
sold good for which he was not paid”). It seems equally likely that the reason why tort claims
are elevated over liens for necessaries is that the United States is unique in recognizing liens
for necessaries in the first place. Such claims did not (and still do not) give rise to maritime
liens under the English maritime law. See The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. at 122–23. Whatever
the reason, tort victims have historically had a maritime lien, giving them priority over other
(although not all) classes of creditors. Id.
204. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
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personal injury, death, and collision claims can satisfy these jurisdic-
tional requirements when they occur at sea, maritime tort claims
can involve products liability claims when those claims involve prod-
ucts associated with the vessels or other maritime equipment.205
Further, just as in the general commercial context, employees who
are the victims of their employers’ negligence are subject to
worker’s compensation regimes. Under maritime law, either the
Jones Act or the Longshore Harbor Workers Compensation Act
covers the claims of tort victims who are employees of the
tortfeasor, and these claims do not give rise to a maritime lien.206
Conceivably, one could argue that the maritime industry does in-
volve a unique context in which injuries may occur because of the
isolation of long sea voyages, especially in shipping. During those
voyages, the vessel is highly dependent on the continuing labor of
the workers aboard and those who provide fuel and other services
to the vessel. Additionally, working at sea poses substantial dangers
to everyone involved in the voyage. These risks include storms at
sea, war, piracy, marine predation, drowning, cargo breaches, and
equipment malfunctions. Because undertaking any sea voyage, no
matter its duration, can involve any of these risks at any time, it is
practical to offer some guarantee of redress should maritime work-
ers suffer tortuous injury before asking them to embark.
Furthermore, a seaman is obligated to obey orders given by the
ship’s captain or master, even when he believes that such obedience
is dangerous to himself. Thus, “[b]ecause of the unique status of
seamen, necessitated by the rigors of the sea, the courts have long
since decided that the burden of the risks incident to their calling
should be borne by the shipowners.”207
While these considerations may justify the unique priority of mar-
itime tort claimants to some degree, it is not a particularly
convincing argument for why tort claimants outside of the maritime
context should not receive similar priority. As an economic matter,
giving tort victims who are part of the trade priority makes sense.
Additionally, the nexus requirement or the level of risk involved in
maritime activity does not undermine either the equitable justifica-
tion usually offered for extending super-priority to tort claimants or
the argument that failing to protect tort victims allows debtors to
externalize their wrong-doing. It is also probably no longer true
205. See, e.g., Matthews v. Hyster Co., 854 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying mari-
time law to a products liability claim based on injury caused by a forklift during cargo
unloading operations).
206. See Hayden & Leland, supra note 90, at 1235.
207. Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1966).
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that any vessel is ever entirely isolated during its voyages, as air or
naval vessels can reach most commercial ships and satellite-based
global positioning systems can probably detect them. Thus, there
does not seem to be any feature of a maritime tort claimant that
would substantiate an argument that non-maritime tort claimants
should not receive similar priority.
2. Limitation of Liability and Insurance
In order to obtain secured financing, maritime debtors must fur-
nish to their lenders a proof of several different types of insurance,
including P&I insurance, which covers potential tort claims. The
cost of such insurance depends, to an extent, on the predictability
of the insured’s potential tort exposure. As discussed above, schol-
ars are concerned that uncertainty may make insurance premiums
unaffordable for either the debtor or the secured creditor.208 Per-
sonification also means that all leins against a vessel are
extinguished once it has been judicially sold. Consistent with these
principles, under the Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability Act (the
Limitation Act), the shipowner’s liability for torts committed by one
of its vessels is limited to the sale value of that vessel.209
Once tort liability has been established, a vessel owner may move
for a limitation action, which subjects the vessel or vessels to a con-
cursus proceeding.210 Courts will deny limitation only if the
shipowner cannot show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
had no “privity or knowledge” of the negligent acts giving rise to
liability.211 If the shipowner can make this showing, the concursus
proceeding requires that all claims against the shipowner and all of
its assets be marshaled before the court, and the court may enjoin
any other proceedings pending against the shipowner in order to
accomplish this.212 If there are insufficient funds to pay all claims in
the proceeding, all claimants—whether or not they hold a maritime
lien—receive a pro rata share of the fund due to the sale of the
vessel.213
208. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 188, at 2007–08.
209. 46 U.S.C. § 30505.
210. Frederick W. Swaim, Jr., Limitation of Liability and Direct Actions: The Relevant Fund, 7
LOY. MAR. L.J. 247, 247–49 (2009).
211. See, e.g., Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1976).
212. See Dennis J. Stone, The Limitation of Liability Act: Time to Abandon Ship?, 32 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 317, 326 (2001).
213. Hayden & Leland, supra note 90, at 1255.
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The principle of limitation is found through maritime law since
at least the twelfth century and is grounded in the difficulty of over-
seeing the ship’s master once the vessel is at sea, as well as the
inability to insure against potentially devastating money judg-
ments.214 In recent years, however, criticism of the Limitation Act
has increased.215 Shipowners are increasingly capable of remaining
in contact with their captains and other crew via ship-to-shore tech-
nology, and new international management standards make it
difficult to argue that the shipowner has no privity or knowledge of
its captains’ actions.216 In addition, injured seamen are permitted to
choose between bringing an action in federal court under maritime
law or bringing an action in state court under the common law.217
However, if a shipowner initiates a limitation action, the courts
would enjoin a seaman’s action in state court against the ship-
owner, and the seaman would have to bring the suit in the
concursus proceeding.218
Despite its controversial nature, limitation is not as old as the
maritime lien, and it likely arose in direct response to the problem
of paying liens and obtaining the release of a seized vessel, although
no authority specifically states this. There is therefore a link be-
tween the lien, limitation, and P&I insurance, the latter of which
also arose in response to the lien and which will be paid even when
limitation is not available, up to the coverage limit (subject to club
rules). Although liability may be available for tort claims, it cannot
be invoked to cover debt financing or credit extended to the ship-
owner because such credit has not been extended to a specific
vessel.219
It could conceivably be argued that limitation might be responsi-
ble for the availability of secured credit in spite of tort claim super-
priority, since the amount of the debtor’s potential tort exposure is
somewhat predictable. This seems unlikely, however, since limita-
tion includes the full value of the vessel, which is generally all of the
collateral the secured creditor’s claim covers. Still, since limitation
is generally available to shipowner debtors and not to others, it
might weigh against the adoption of tort victim super-priority
214. See id. at 1253–54.
215. See generally Stone, supra note 206, at 327–36; Jill A. Schaar, The Shipowners’ Limitation
of Liability Act: Still Afloat or Sinking Fast?, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 659 (2000); Mark A. While, The
1851 Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act: Should the Courts Deliver the Final Blow?, 24 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 821, 835–44 (2004).
216. See Stone, supra note 212, at 327–28.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 330–32.
219. Hayden & Leland, supra note 90, at 1255.
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outside the maritime context unless a similar limitation were availa-
ble. Since most debtors that rely on secured credit are small and
medium-sized businesses, the potential for ruinous tort awards is
real without limitation.
The lack of limitation also raises the related question of insur-
ance. Many businesses purchase general liability or other types of
insurance intended to cover tort claims. But, as noted in Part III.C
infra, even when companies are insured, they may be underinsured
or they may discover that a policy exclusion prevents coverage for
particular tort victims. Thus, if the maritime priority scheme were
adopted, limitation is a potential legislative response that might
have a two-fold effect: first, it would lessen the likelihood of devas-
tating tort liability where the limitation can be invoked; second, it
might make insurance more affordable, since limitation offers a
form of predictability for insurance companies. Limitation thus
weighs both for and against the maritime priority system. On the
one hand, it weighs against the adoption of tort victim super-prior-
ity outside of the maritime context, but on the other hand, it might
be an argument in favor of such adoption, as long as it is extended
along with the super-priority.
3. Vessels as Primary Assets
Vessels are the primary financial asset of many maritime debtors.
One could argue that there is already a procedure in place for debt-
ors. like maritime companies, that have most of their assets
embodied in identifiable property. The Bankruptcy Code provides
an exception to the automatic stay on all debt-collection actions by
allowing, in certain circumstances, collection against single asset
real estate.220 This exception allows creditors with priority claims
and liens on the real estate to foreclose on that property and dis-
tribute the assets among them.
Single-asset bankruptcy does not help the involuntary creditor.221
Mortgages and liens that potentially consume all of the sales pro-
ceeds generally encumber real property. Furthermore, even where
tort claimants exist, they are behind mortgage holders in priority as
220. Kenneth P. Coleman, The Scope of the “Single Asset Real Estate” Exception, 114 BANKING
L. J. 548, 548–49 (1997).
221. Scholars have heavily criticized the single asset exception to the automatic stay in
bankruptcy as leading to gamesmanship on the part of creditors. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart,
Games Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and The Single Asset Loan Workout,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1117 (1996).
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well as behind statutory lien holders whose claims pre-date the tort
judgment.
Thus, the real question with respect to the vessels is whether
their existence as a single, identifiable source of collateral justifies
tort victim priority in a way that does not apply outside of the mari-
time context. The existence of the vessel is likely a stronger
justification for the maritime debt collection procedure, specifically
the use of the in rem action to enforce a maritime lien, as opposed
to an argument for the existence of the maritime priority scheme.
Because the judicial sale proceeds of a vessel can satisfy the lien, the
existence of the vessel or vessels does make satisfaction of tort judg-
ments more clear-cut in some ways. In other ways, however, the
existence of the vessel may work to the prejudice of tort claimants,
since the limitation of shipowner’s liability to the value of the vessel
still applies when there is insurance coverage for the tort victim’s
claim—a state of affairs that has been challenged but has yet to
change.222 The existence of the maritime lien for tort claims is likely
a major reason why most maritime debtors have P&I insurance,
since secured lenders demand it before extending debt financing.
Thus, the vessels and their value are not likely to be a reason to
confine tort victim super-priority to the maritime context.
C. The Effect of Giving Tort Victims Super-Priority
It is impossible to predict with absolute certainty what would hap-
pen if tort claimants were given super-priority. However, the success
of secured credit in the maritime world seems to challenge a num-
ber of conclusions reached on both sides of the debate over
secured credit—specifically, that secured credit necessarily encour-
ages poor monitoring and the inefficient use of debt covenants and
that involuntary creditor priority would make it impossible for debt-
ors to obtain financing. Regarding the first assumption, there is no
evidence that secured lenders in the maritime context are poor
monitors or that they draft inefficient loan covenants. It is entirely
possible that, given the maritime industry’s susceptibility to dra-
matic fluctuations in energy and shipping demands, loan covenants
are drafted to penalize debtors who engage in reckless financial be-
havior in an attempt to make up for or to inoculate against those
market fluctuations.
222. See generally Riaz Zaman, Sailing on Troubled Waters—Antiquated U.S. Maritime Liability
Limits for Death and Injuries of Ship Passengers: Options for Reform, 42 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 41
(2013).
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Second, maritime law illustrates the incorrectness of the assump-
tion that involuntary creditor super-priority would negatively affect
the availability of credit. Secured credit is readily available to both
large and small companies in the maritime context, although the
cost of obtaining secured credit is higher for maritime debtors. This
ready availability of secured credit could be attributed to the fact
that, for most maritime debtors, the vessels represent the entirety of
the collateral available to secure financing. Because the vessels may
represent a large part of the debtor’s value, there is an incentive to
stake a claim on them. Moreover, since lenders know that there is
always the possibility that maritime liens will arise, they could be
incentivized to obtain a security interest that will at least offer some
guarantee of a piece of the vessels in case of insolvency or bank-
ruptcy. Thus, the maritime priority scheme itself might actually
encourage secured lending, as opposed to stifling it.
Any change in the priority structure of credit invites criticism
that it could freeze credit markets and dry up the availability of se-
cured credit altogether, notwithstanding the maritime example.223
On its face, this is not necessarily a bad thing—at least with respect
to large, risky ventures that are likely to have involuntary creditors.
While strengthening the judgment lien and giving it super-priority
may mean that potential borrowers with low liquidity and high risk
will not obtain financing or will pay more for, it is also possible that,
as in the maritime industry, debtors and secured creditors will find
ways to adjust. Commercial lenders are in the business of providing
debt financing, and secured loans are still a safer option for lenders
when it comes to extending financing to small and mid-size compa-
nies that do not have the assets to forego secured lending.
The real problem with granting tort victims super-priority could
be the potential effect on the cost of secured credit to large, high-
risk companies that have considerable potential exposure to tort
liability. Yet these companies do not traditionally finance with se-
cured debt.224 In fact, many small businesses do not have
involuntary creditors—or any creditors at all, other than their se-
cured lenders.225 Given this, why would a debate about secured
credit be necessary, since the firms most like to incur involuntary
creditor claims do not even use it?226 But one aim of the secured
credit debate should be to persuade those large, high-risk compa-
nies to use secured credit in order to trigger the monitoring aspects
223. See supra Part I.B.
224. Id.
225. Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1166 (2002).
226. See Listoken, supra note 14, at 1040.
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of security over those debtors who most need a watchful eye. On
either side of the secured credit debate, there is a conflict between
those who advance the monitoring function of secured credit and
those who argue that secured credit takes the place of adequate
monitoring.227
In the maritime context, all borrowers, no matter their size, are
going to incur maritime liens—the question is whether timely pay-
ment can discharge those liens immediately or whether the debtor
has so little ability to pay that an in rem action is the likely result. By
contrast, smaller firms in the general commercial context are not
likely to have many involuntary creditors.228 Thus, if a priority
scheme like the maritime approach were adopted in the general
commercial world, the only parties that would have difficulty ob-
taining secured credit would be those with liquidity and credit
problems that want to enter into high-risk ventures that expose
them to an increased likelihood of tort liability or financial col-
lapse. If, on the other hand, a company has poor credit but does
not seek out businesses that expose it to potential tort liability or if
the company seems able to pay its employees, the secured creditor
may be less inclined to refuse to extend credit based on the pro-
posed lien, since chances are better that the lien will never arise.
Finally, although the maritime example does show that addi-
tional costs are incurred in obtaining insurance and drafting loan
documents with strict covenants, the additional transaction costs of
this system may not be prohibitive, or, at least, do not have to be
prohibitive. In fact, many lenders in the maritime industry are
larger banks such as Citigroup, BNP Paribas, Regions Financial Cor-
poration and U.S. Bancorp, all of which have equipment finance
divisions that handle ship and fleet mortgages and provide secured
financing for vessel construction.229 The fact that these are the same
institutions that provide secured credit to many non-maritime com-
mercial debtors indicates that involuntary creditor super-priority
227. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1149–61.
228. See Listoken, supra note 14, at 1051, 1057–59.
229. See, e.g., REGIONS BANK, REGIONS EQUIPMENT FINANCE (2007), available at https://www
.regions.com/virtualDocuments/cb_Equipment.pdf; Jim Lawrence, Dealmaker of the Year:
Michael Parker and Citi, MARINE MONEY,February/March 2013, at 16, available at  https://www
.marinemoney.com/sites/all/themes/marinemoney/publications/awards/2012_Dealmaker
.pdf; Latest Awards & Rankings: BNP Paribas Awarded as the Editor’s Choice by Marine Money, BNP
PARIBAS CORP. & INST. BANKING, http://cib.bnpparibas.com/Products-services/Financing-
your-business/Shipping-Finance/page.aspx/159 (last visited Feb. 26, 2015);; U.S. Bank Equip-
ment Finance, U.S. BANCORP, https://www.usbank.com/cgi_w/cfm/commercial_business/pro
ducts_and_services/equip_fin_ps.cfm?icid=PB_10412&WT.mc_id-r10412&original_ref=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Egoogle%2Ecom%2F (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
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has not stopped maritime lending. Further, it means that many in-
stitutional secured lenders already have systems in place that
account for involuntary creditor super-priority. Thus, adopting a
version of the maritime priority model with respect to tort victims
would only require many larger lenders to do what they already
know how to do. What is less clear is what steps secured lenders
would take to protect their claims in a scheme in which they no
longer have the highest priority. Whereas lenders in the maritime
industry demand proof of insurance from debtors, LoPucki’s sug-
gestion to require insurance for lenders is possibly a more cost-
effective option, especially for smaller companies.230 Whether or
not such costs would have a freezing effect on the availability of
credit is difficult to predict, but the maritime example illustrates
that such an effect is not the necessary result of super-priority for
tort victims.
CONCLUSION
The case study of maritime law shows that both sides of the de-
bate over secured credit may be operating under false assumptions
or drawing false conclusions, and that a solution that protects the
interests of both involuntary and secured creditors is possible. Per-
haps the most striking insight the maritime priority scheme
provides is that giving super-priority to involuntary creditors does
not freeze the availability of credit, at least in certain contexts. In
some ways, the maritime example reinforces the arguments of
scholars who have called for revision of Article 9 to protect such
creditors, but, in other ways, it supports the argument that secured
credit provides a valuable monitoring function. The maritime sys-
tem may thus be more efficient than the current Article 9 system,
especially since the firms that society would most want monitored—
that is, high-risk companies with significant potential tort expo-
sure—are most likely to utilize secured credit. To the extent that
the system could be modified to encourage lenders to demand se-
cured credit before lending to these types of debtors, it should be
considered whether some version of the maritime approach could
be adopted.
Many aspects of the maritime priority system respond to the
unique hazards of doing business on the open water. Additionally,
secured lending may be so ubiquitous in the maritime context be-
cause of the value of the vessels, while other debtors may not have
230. See LoPucki, supra note 9, at 1912–13.
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so much of their capital in equipment or some other identifiable
res. Thus, the maritime priority system cannot simply be adopted
wholesale and without alteration for the non-maritime context.
However, this system could be used to revise the priority of secured
credit to create a more efficient model that costs society less and
preserves economic gains. Most of all, the maritime law example
illustrates that some of the fundamental assumptions underlying
the debate over Article 9 may be incorrect, and that a closer study
of the cost of secured credit to maritime debtors as well as the insur-
ance and regulatory reactions to the maritime priority system may
shed new light on the debate.
